Finding ways to encourage investments in renewable electricity production is crucial to reach a transition to a sustainable energy system. While in the energy policy literature, investments are usually explained by economic or regulatory policies, recent studies have suggested that some investors are boundedly rational and may respond differently to policies. In this paper, a framework is proposed to make a more complete analysis of the institutional demands influencing emerging investors in renewable electricity production. Based on 35 cases, both formal and informal demands were identified and their impact on emerging investors' behavior was analyzed. Results show that besides formal institutional demands, emerging investors were influenced by their task environment and by various informal demands which originated in investors' collective and internal contexts. However, different investors were affected by different institutional demands. They also responded in different ways to the same demands; while some perceived a specific demand as imposing, others regarded it as inducing. These findings provide a better understanding of the institutional forces affecting emerging investors in renewable electricity. The paper suggests new policies to handle the heterogeneity of investors and opens up for a new panorama of informal policy channels, where network effects can be utilized to trigger emerging investors' decisions.
Introduction 1
In recent years, a large number of actors have invested in renewable electricity (RE) production, 1 including 2 not only established electricity producers, such as big utilities and municipal or regional energy companies, 3 but also emerging investors such as individuals and households, cooperatives, project developers, farmers 4 and companies diversifying from other industries [2, 3] . Considering the limits to government investment 5 budgets, such investors are important in order to achieve a transition to a more sustainable energy system 6
[4]. 7 8
In the energy policy literature, this trend is explained by referring to the energy policy instruments that are 9 in place in many countries today; actors are believed to invest either because economic incentives such as 10 feed-in tariffs or tradable green certificates make RE production competitive with conventional electricity 11 production or because they are forced to invest by renewable performance standards or other types of 12
regulations [e.g. 5]. Among the economic incentives currently used, some are technology-specific (e.g. the 13
feed-in tariffs used in Germany and in France), and other generic, i. In this paper, we study emerging investors in RE production in Sweden with the purpose of identifying 29 how their investment decisions were influenced by various formal and informal institutional demands. 30
Theoretical framework 31

Economic rationality vs. institutional demands 32
Why do firms and other actors invest in RE production and what influences their investment decisions? 33
In the energy economics literature, investors are generally assumed to behave in an economically rational 34 way, i.e. to make a specific investment only if the expected economic return on that investment is positive 35 and higher than on other investments [2] . Similar assumptions are also implicit in much of the energy 36 policy literature, especially in discussions on how to promote RE production, where it is emphasized that 37 RE production is not yet competitive with conventional energy production and that policy measures to 38 level the playing field therefore is needed to attract investors [4, 8- It is useful to first distinguish the task environment from the institutional environment. [22] . The task 50 environment includes "normal" business aspects related to the development and production of products 51 that actors exchange in the market, e.g. sources of input, markets for outputs and competitors [22] . It 52 primarily exerts demands (or pressures) on actors in the form of requirements on efficiency and 53 effectiveness [22] , for example customers bargaining to get higher-quality products or lower prices [23] . 54
Institutional environments, in contrast, include regulations, social norms and social expectations that 55 individuals and organizations have to comply with in order to secure legitimacy, resources and power [6, 56 24, 25] . Demands from the institutional environment come in the form of prescriptions regarding "the 57 right thing to do" (in a legal, moral or cognitive senses) and the right way to do things (e.g. acceptable 58
types of organizational forms for a particular task [22] 
A cross-case analysis of 35 emerging investors 138
In order to understand the influences of formal and informal institutional demands on the behavior of 139 emerging entrants, we used a cross-case analysis. This method is particularly well suited to clarify people's 140 perceptions, assumptions, prejudgments and predispositions. Indeed, in addition to giving interviewees 141 the freedom to describe their investment process from their own viewpoint instead of forcing them to 142 label it as a predefined process (as e.g. quantitative methods such as survey would have done) [52, 53] , it 143
gives the researcher the possibility to observe patterns of behaviors through the discovery of polar types 144 or replicating behaviors [54] . 145
Our starting point for the selection of cases of emerging investors was to identify them within the larger 146 population of investors in RE production available in the TGC database. This was done by excluding 147 energy sector incumbents (i.e. state-owned and privately owned utilities and energy companies) and 148 instead focusing on emerging investors, such as farmers, companies coming from other industrial sectors, 149 associations, public organizations, individuals and independent power producers. Through this process, 150
we found that in July 2012, emerging investors owned about 75 percent of the RE plants in Sweden and 151 about 55 percent of the installed capacity [55] . 152
Once the emerging investors identified in the overall data, cases of emerging investors were selected to 153 provide a variety of contexts with regard to potential task and institutional environments (see Table 1 ). 154
Since the goal of cross-case analysis is not to reach statistical representativeness of the overall population, 155 but rather to acquire insight into a specific phenomenon and to consider the potential behavioral variation 156 among cases, we continuously added cases in order to increase the analytical power of the data we instead encouraged them to describe their process quite freely. 170
One limitation with qualitative interview methodology is that it leaves room for interpretation of the 171 researcher conducting the study and analysis, as well as perceptions of interviewees answering questions. 172
In the interviews, some respondents may have transformed their answers to match what they thought the 173 researcher expected or they may have selected only the information that they perceived made them look in 174 a better light. In order to reduce the risk of bias interpretation in the analysis, interviews were recorded, 175 transcribed and coding independently by two researchers. We evaluate the risk of distorted answers as low 176 for two reasons. First, the interviewees did not only described the bright side of their investment process, 177 but aspects which, from a purely economic perspective were not rational, and well as aspects which they 178 considered as mistakes. Second, the constituency of patterns obtained through cross-case analysis 179 strengthens the reliability of the findings. Nevertheless, opportunities to make findings more reliable and 180 generalizable represent opportunities for further research, which are discussed in Section 5 of this paper. 181
The coding was made into two steps. First, the data was coded to identify the sources of demands that 182 influenced investors. As described in Table 2 , demands from the task environment and from formal 183 institutions were coded based on descriptions in the literature introduced in Section 2. Institutional 184 demands were coded as informal when they were tacit and came either from the investors' networks or 185 stakeholders or from the investors themselves but were not related to any written or official document. 186
Second, once the sources of demands had been identified, the nature of their influence was coded. 187
Overall, demands were coded as imposing when investors described them as being out of their control, if 188 they did not consider any other option than to invest or if they made the investment unwillingly. Demands 189 were coded as inducing when investors described them as drivers or motivators or when they led actors to 190 invest voluntarily, without being forced to. More details about the coding of different demands and their 191 characteristics can be found in Table 2 and evidence of the coding can be found in the presentation of the 192 data in Table 3.  193   INSERT TABLE 2 Some of the interviewed investors reported demands coming from the task environment of their main 208 business activity or from the task environment of renewable electricity. For instance, although it was not 209 intended changes in their stakeholders' strategies led them to evaluate the possibility to start producing 210 renewable electricity (cf. cases 6, 12). Likewise, a change in the market lowering or increasing the value of 211 the main resource used in their main activity triggered the decision to invest in renewable electricity (cf. 212 cases 3, 9, 18). In other cases, it was a change in the electricity prices or in the renewable electricity 213 technology prices that were decisive (cf. cases 7, case 10, 15). 214
As illustrated in Table 2 , demands from the task environment were both imposing and inducing for 215 investors' decision. Interestingly, the same type of pressures, for instance an increase in the electricity 216 prices, was both inducing for some investors (e.g. case 10) and imposing for others (e.g. cases 15, 27). 217
Surprisingly, compared with the demands coming from formal and informal institutions described in the 218 following sections, pressures coming from the task environment affected the decision to enter the 219 renewable electricity production, but it did not seem to impact the investment process. 220
Formal institutional demands 221
As presented in Table 2 , formal demands had a clear impact on the interviewees' investments in renewable 222 electricity production. Similarly to the demands coming from the task environment, formal demands were 223 perceived differently among investors: some described them as imposing, for instance when they felt 224 forced to comply with regulations by investing (e.g. case 17), whereas other described them as inducing, 225 for instance when policies created an incentive to invest (e.g. cases 10, 16, 21, 23, 29 and 32). 226
Yet, while the energy literature restricts the formal demands to regulatory and economic instruments for 227 renewable energy investments, our study showed that other policy instruments, such as tax exemptions 228 (cf. cases 6, 9, 10, 18, 26, 27) also played a key role in the decision process. Formal corporate policies, such 229 as a new environmental strategy or new corporate objectives towards sustainability, which can be seen as 230 formal demands at the company level, also had an influence in some cases (cf. cases 12, 13, 18, 21, 24, 30, 231 35). 232
Another key finding was that formal institutional demands were not only the trigger for some investors' 233 decision (as in cases 6, 10, 11, 12, 16-18, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32), but they also affected the investment 234 process. In some cases, for example, it made the decision easier to take or to argue for in the organization 235 (cf. cases 4, 7, 9, 25, 31). In that matter, it should be noted that in many cases, economic policy 236 instruments represented a "bonus", i.e. some extra support that the investors did not expect to get, which 237 lowered the risk of the investment or made it more profitable (cf. cases 4, 7). 238
Informal institutional demands 239
As argued in the institutional literature (but quite overlooked by the energy policy literature), informal 240 institutional demands have been at least as influential -and in many cases even more -as the formal 241 institutional demands. Two main types of informal demands emerged from our interviews: collective and 242 internal. 243
Collective informal demands 244
Collective demands came from external stakeholders and were often directed towards a responsible 245 environmental or societal behavior, for instance customers requiring environmental-friendly practices. As 246 illustrated in Table 2 , some investors chose to start producing renewable electricity because they wanted to 247 match what according to them was what everyone else thought was right (cf. cases1-3, 17, 35) or because 248 they saw it as a way to increase their legitimacy or to improve their image (cf. cases 7-10, 13, 15, 20, 32). 249
The collective informal demands were both inducing and imposing. Indeed, while some of them saw the 250 decision to invest as a way to comply with norms coming from external stakeholders (cf. cases 1, 6, 17, 23 251 and 32), some of them saw the opportunity to set the standards towards competitors or in the eyes of 252 their clients, for instance by being among the first companies in their region or in their branch to invest in 253 the technology or take actions towards a better environment (cf. cases 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 35). 254
As for the formal demands, collective demands had a dual effect: in some cases, they triggered decisions 255 to invest (e.g. cases 1, 3, 6, 13, 23), whereas in other cases they influenced the investment process once an 256 investment decision had been made (cf. cases 7, 16, 17, 18). 257
Internal informal demands 258
Internal demands were associated with the investors' internal characteristics, such as what they described 259 as their interest, their values or their beliefs. As illustrated in 
Opportunities for further research 337
Our research has limitations that also represent opportunities for further research. First, the study 338 included four main RE technologies; wind, hydro, solar and biomass power. It may therefore be 339 questioned whether the results (e.g. with regard to investor constellations and the institutional demands 340 affecting them) would have been different if we only had focused on one technology, e.g. wind power or 341 solar power specifically. We therefore encourage future research to further investigate the investor 342 heterogeneity with RE technologies, for instance by focusing on one specific technology or by comparing 343 investors of one RE technology with those of another RE technology. Likewise, as developed in the 344 methodology section, the study context of the research conducted in this paper is Sweden and, although 345 there are indications that investor constellations may be comparable to other institutional settings, it 346 would still be very relevant to increase the generalization of the findings by adding cases of other 347 countries, e.g. other cases of European countries and cases of countries where no or different energy 348 policies are in place. 349
Second, also with regards to methodology, we have argued for the relevance of qualitative studies in the 350 explorative stage of the research on institutional demands. Now that this stage has been done and that 351
propositions have been made in the conclusions of this paper, there are opportunities for testing these 352
propositions through quantitative research, e.g. through surveys. 353
Finally, this study focused on the emerging investors of RE production because of their particular 354 relevance for the energy system transition and because of their potential diversity with regard to 355 institutional demands. Now that this has been done and that our results have confirmed the influence of 356 informal institutional pressures in relation to formal institutional pressures (and governmental policies in 357 particular), there are reasons to wonder whether this may only be the case for emerging investors, or if the 358 more established actors such as utilities may also be affected by additional institutional demands than only 359 governmental policies. We therefore encourage other scholars to further study what influences traditional 360 investors, such as utilities, to make the choices that they make and on what basis. This may be the first 361 step in sharpening current policies in order to adapt them better to the current formal and informal 362 institutional context. 363
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Financial support from the Swedish Energy Agency's AES programme (Project 33685-1) is gratefully 365 acknowledged. 366 Table 1 . Cases included in the study Imposing: Investments are a result of an event out of investors' control or of a defensive behaviour due to the perception of a threat on their current business model or activity coming from their business environment.
Inducing: Investments are perceived as an opportunity or are made possible due to an event or change coming from investors' business environment or from the market.
Formal institutions
Governmental policy instruments. E.g. change in regulation, creation of an incentive policy.
Imposing: Investments are a result of a change in policies, which is perceived as a burden or an undesired source of expensive by investors.
Inducing: Investments are perceived as an opportunity or are facilitated due to a change in regulatory or incentive policy.
Corporate policies and strategies. E.g. change in the corporate policy, creation of a new corporate strategy.
Inducing: Investments are motivated by a company vision or goal initiated proactively by the investor, as a way to be a leader or initiator of a social change.
Informal institutions
Collective norms, values and opinion emerging from investors' closest network. E.g. neighbours, friends, family expressing their opinion or acting in a way that encourages investors to imitate them.
Imposing: Investments are the result of a strong belief in investors' network and community that investing is the right thing to do and that not investing would be irrational. Investors perceive the demand as an imposed choice. Internal values and norms that are related to the cognitive identity or culture of investors. These characteristics that are loaded with positive or negative values and appraisal. E.g. being a family man, a farmer, an entrepreneur, a risktaker.
Imposing: Investments and investment strategies are limited or framed by internal norms and values, which creates a parallel rationality in investors' eyes. Investors perceived the demand as imposing but it is so close to the values and norms, which they identify themselves with, that they do not even consider going against it.
Inducing: Investors are motivated to invest based on internal norms and values that create a type of unbeatable rationality in their eyes. Investors do not perceive the demand as an imposed choice but instead are proud of being identified with it. 
